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Debtors' Name or Identity Changes: Distributing
Benefits and Burdens Under Article 9
By Claude Michael Stern*
"Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in
their search of things, and analyzes their meaning, is in great danger
of being deceived?"'
Of the many celebrated features of Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (Code), certainly one of the most curious is the signifi-
cance attached to the document known as the financing statement.
2
Through the filing of the financing statement, the Code attempts to as-
sign specific rights and liabilities to the parties concerned with a se-
cured transaction. Even more curious than the general import of the
financing statement is the attention that Article 9 gives to the formal
aspects of the financing statement. This Note focuses on the problems
associated with one of those formal requirements: the need for the
financing statement to identify and be filed under the debtor's3 name.
In particular, the Note addresses, under both the 1962 Code and the
1972 Code, the resolution of the problems arising from a change of the
debtor's name or identity after the financing statement has been filed
by a secured creditor4 to perfect5 a security interest6 in the debtor's
* B.A., 1977, University of California at Los Angeles. Member, Third Year Class.
1. PLATO, Craylus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 470 (5th ed. E. Hamil-
ton & H. Cairns 1961) (Socrates speaking to Cratylus).
2. The rules governing the filing, form, and effect of the financing statement are con-
tained in Part 4 of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The financing statement is
most popularly called the UCC-l form; an example of its proper format is given in U.C.C.
§ 9-402(3) of the 1962, 1972, and 1978 versions.
3. Section 9-105(l)(d) of the 1962 Code defines a debtor as "the person who owes
payment or other performance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has
rights in the collateral, and includes the seller of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper.
Where the debtor and the owner of the collateral are not the same person, the term 'debtor'
means the owner of the collateral in any provision of the Article dealing with the collateral,
the obligor in any provision dealing with the obligation, and may include both where the
context so requires .. " U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(d) (1962 version). The definition was changed
by the 1972 amendments which deleted the phrase "contract rights." See U.C.C. § 9-
105(l)(d) (1972 version).
4. The terms "secured party" and "secured creditor" are used interchangeably
throughout this Note. "Secured party" is defined by the 1962 Code as being "a lender, seller
or other person in whose favor there is a security interest, including a person to whom ac-
counts, contract rights or chattel paper have been sold. When the holders of obligations
issued under an indenture of trust, equipment trust agreement or the like are represented by
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property.
To appreciate the problems caused by a "postperfection" name or
identity change by the debtor, the filing of the financing statement must
be viewed from the perspectives of both existing and prospective se-
cured creditors.7 From the secured creditor's point of view, the filing of
the financing statement with the Secretary of State or other appropriate
agency is extremely important, as this is the method by which creditors
perfect their security interests in certain kinds of collateral. 8  By
perfecting the security interest, a creditor becomes a member of the
class of creditors whose claims to the collateral or its proceeds 9 are su-
perior to those of unperfected secured creditors, should the debtor de-
fault on credit payments'0 or declare bankruptcy." For the members
a trustee or other person, the representative is the secured party." U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(m)
(1962 version). Again, the 1972 amendments changed the definition by deleting the phrase
"contract rights." See U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(m) (1972 version).
5. The rules governing the perfection of security interests are contained in Part 3 of
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. For a general discussion of perfection and
associated concepts, see R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 56-116 (2d ed. 1979) [herein-
after cited as HENSON].
6. The term "security interest" is defined as "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-210(37) (1962
version); U.C.C. § 1-210(37) (1972 version).
7. In this Note, the terms "existing secured creditor" and "secured creditor" are used
to refer to the party to the secured transaction who entered into a security agreement with
the debtor and filed a financing statement to perfect the security interest in the debtor's
property. The term "prospective secured creditor" is used to refer to a person or organiza-
tion that wishes to enter into a security agreement with the debtor and therefore must search
the financing statements filed with the Secretary of State to find any prior encumbrances on
the debtor's property.
8. "Collateral" is defined in § 9-105(l)(c) of the 1962 Code as being "the property
subject to a security interest, and includes accounts, contract rights and chattel paper which
have been sold." U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(c) (1962 version). The phrase "contract rights" has been
deleted from the 1972 version of Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(c) (1972 version).
9. "Proceeds" are defined in the 1962 Code as including "whatever is received when
collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of." U.C.C. § 9-
306(1) (1962 version).
10. "Default" is not specifically defined in the Code, but rather is defined by the agree-
ment between the secured party and the debtor. U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (1978 version). "The
primary event of default will be a failure to make required payments to the secured party in
accordance with the schedule agreed upon . . . .Beyond this point, the events of default
vary depending on the kinds of collateral, whether the transaction is purchase money or not,
the debtor's business (if the debtor is not a consumer) and so on." HENSON, supra note 5, at
350.
11. "It is often said that the acid test of a security interest is in the debtor's bank-
ruptcy." HENSON, supra note 5, at 258. In bankruptcy, the rights of a "perfected" secured
creditor are not necessarily superior to those of other "perfected" or "unperfected" creditors.
For a discussion of bankruptcy and Article 9, see HENSON, supra note 5, at 258-91. Al-
though Article 9 never explicitly states that an unperfected security interest is subordinate to
the rights of secured parties with perfected security interests, such is the apparent effect of
§§ 9-301(l)(a) and 9-312 of the Code. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(l)(a), 9-312 (1962 version).
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of this class, priority of claims generally is determined by priority in
time of filing or perfecting of the security interest.'
2
Since a secured party's ability to recover from the debtor hinges on
perfecting a security interest, the responsibility for properly filing a
financing statement rests on the secured party. Section 9-402 of the
1962 Code, which specifies the formal requisites of the financing state-
ment, does not on its face require a statement of the debtor's identity at
the time of filing.' 3 The courts, however, have implied such a require-
ment from the Code provision requiring that the financing statement be
filed under the debtor's name.' 4 Indeed, the failure of a secured credi-
tor to identify the debtor adequately in the financing statement is suffi-
cient grounds for finding a security interest unperfected, despite
compliance with all other filing requirements.'
5
The heavy sanction imposed on a secured party for improper iden-
tification of the debtor in the financing statement is justifiable in view
of the function of the financing statement: to give public notice of a
potential security interest in the debtor's property. 6 The Code contem-
12. See U.C.C. § 9-312 (1978 version) for the method the Code uses to determine prior-
ity among secured parties in different financing situations.
13. Section 9-402 of the 1962 Code formally required the financing statement to con-
tain (I) the signatures and addresses of both parties to the secured transaction and (2) a
description of the collateral by type or item. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1962 version).
14. Several courts have implied the name of the debtor to be a formal requirement of
the financing statement. This implied requirement is based on § 9-403(4) which requires an
indexing of the financing statement by the name of the debtor, U.C.C. § 9-403(4) (1962
version), and the practical consideration that prospective secured creditors would search
under the debtor's name. See, e.g., In re Merrill, 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 757 (D. Neb. 1971)
(in bankruptcy); In re Levins, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1076 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (in bankruptcy).
See also Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. v. Tabenken (In re Brawn), 7 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
565 (D. Me. 1970) (in bankruptcy), where the court points out that "[a]lthough the language
of § 9-402(1) does not specifically require that the name of the debtor appear on the financ-
ing statements, § 9-402(3) does contain such a requirement and the form of financing state-
ment [sic] there recited must be substantially followed in order to comply with subsection
(1)." Id at 568 (footnotes omitted).
15. Section 9-402(5) of the 1962 Code states that "[a] financing statement substantially
complying with the requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor
errors which are not seriously misleading." U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1962 version). This section
was applied by the courts when considering whether the financing statement's failure to
identify the debtor was so "seriously misleading" to prospective secured creditors that the
previous security interest should be held unperfected. For a discussion of the cases dealing
with this problem, see Note, The Effect ofErrors and Changes in the Debtor's Name on Article
Nine Security Interests, 1975 DUKE L.J. 148 [hereinafter cited as Errors and Changes in the
Debtor's Name].
16. The purpose of the Code's notice filing system is to indicate "merely that the se-
cured party who has filed may have a security interest in the collateral described." U.C.C.
§ 9-402, Comment 2 (1962 version). One need not have a security interest in the debtor's
property to file, as it is possible to file before entering into a security agreement. U.C.C. § 9-
303, Comment 1 (1962 version). For a general discussion of the Code's notice filing system,
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plates that prospective secured parties will search for existing encum-
brances on the debtor's property.' 7 The notice filing system is, in turn,
a convenient means by which prior security interests can be discovered
by an interested party.' 8 The notice filing system therefore simultane-
ously imposes a burden on the secured party to identify the debtor
properly in the financing statement at the time of the filing and a bur-
den on prospective secured creditors to investigate the past commercial
transactions of the debtor before extending credit. 19 Consequently,
both the existing and prospective secured parties receive distinct bene-
fits from the filing of the financing statement.
Problems arise, however, when a financing statement that was
originally effective loses its notice value because of the debtor's change
of name or identity after the original filing. In such a case, the secured
party has complied with the requirement of identifying the debtor in
the financing statement at the time of the filing. Nevertheless, prospec-
tive secured creditors may find a search of the financing statements
under the debtor's new name or identity unproductive, particularly
when the new and original names or identities are significantly differ-
ent. The resulting lack of effective notice from the financing statement
see Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel
Security Laws, Including "'Notice Filing," 47 IOWA L. REV. 289 (1962).
17. See notes 72-78 & accompanying text infra for a discussion of the investigative
responsibilities of prospective secured creditors.
18. As the financing statement indicates only the possibility of an encumbrance on the
debtor's property, it is necessary for prospective creditors to conduct their own investigation
as to, e.g., the value of the outstanding encumbrances, the debtor's possession of possibly
encumbered property, and the duration of the outstanding encumbrances.
19. The gravity of the secured creditor's failure to properly identify the debtor in the
financing statement is best demonstrated by those cases that consider the inadequacy of the
financing statement's identification of the debtor as grounds for terminating the perfected
status of a prior perfected security interest. These cases, which have been popularly called
the ab initio cases, all involve financing statements that were alleged to be seriously mislead-
ing to prospective secured creditors and, therefore, were held to be ineffective as of the time
they were filed. For a fuller discussion of these cases, see Errors and Changes in the Debtor's
Name, supra note 15, at 150-56. See also W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS 127-31 (1978) [hereinafter cited as DAVENPORT & MURRAY]; HENSON, supra note
5, at 66-70. The gravity of the prospective secured creditor's failure to conduct a thorough
investigation of the debtor is best illustrated by considering the potential consequences to the
prospective secured creditor for a failure to discover the existence of a prior perfected inter-
est in the collateral.
20. Where the old and new names are substantially similar, the courts have not been
willing to void the previously perfected security interest. See Corwin v. RCA Corp. (In re
Kittyhawk Television Corp.), 516 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1975) (in bankruptcy), rev'g 383 F. Supp.
691 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (Kittyhawk Broadcasting Corporation changed to Kittyhawk Televi-
sion Corporation); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Bank of Main, 36 Cal. App. 3d 286,
111 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1973) (Loch Lomand Boat Shop and Loch Lomand Yacht Sales changed
to Loch Lomand Yacht Sales, Inc.); Fliegel v. Associates Capital Co. of Del., Inc., 272 Or.
434, 537 P.2d 1144 (1975) (Clint's Appliance Sales and Services changed to Clint's Appli-
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draws into question its effectiveness and hence the perfected status of
the existing security interest.
The 1962 Code does not contain a provision dealing explicitly with
a debtor's postperfection name or identity change. Consequently, one
might expect that such a change would not affect the rights or liabilities
of the parties concerned with a secured transaction. The. issue, how-
ever, has not been resolved so neatly. Courts dealing with this issue
under the 1962 Code were faced with the argument that the financing
statement, although identifying the debtor when originally filed, failed
to identify the debtor sufficiently after its name or identity change and
consequently the secured creditor's interest was unperfected. 21 The
majority of courts considering this or similar arguments under the 1962
Code were not persuaded and left the secured creditor's interest in-
tact.22 Analysis of these decisions, however, reveals general uncertainty
as to the proper rationale for resolving the problem. The source of this
confusion is the failure of the Code to articulate the precise burdens the
notice filing system was intended to impose on both existing and pro-
spective secured creditors.
A belated response to the problems caused by debtors' postperfec-
tion name or identity changes was embodied in the 1972 amendments
to Article 9. Subsection 9-402(7),23 although a potentially promising
cure, has been referred to in commercial cases only infrequently, most
often only in dicta.24 This Note, by considering the various problems
associated with each kind of name or identity change effected by debt-
ors, first examines the uncertainty over the filing and investigative bur-
ance, Inc.). Similarly, minor errors in the original financial statement which do not impede
the prospective secured creditor from receiving notice of a prior security interest are not
considered seriously misleading. See Errors and Changes in the Debtors Name, supra note
15, at 151-56.
21. Although this would be the essential thrust of a proponent's argument, the form of
the argument varies. See notes 89-108 & accompanying text infra.
22. Only four cases have found the secured creditor's perfected security interest in the
collateral affected by the change. Burnett v. H.O.U. Corp. (In re Kalamazoo Steel Process,
Inc.), 503 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1974) (in bankruptcy); King v. Williams (In re Conger Printing
Co.), 18 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 224 (D. Or. 1975) (in bankruptcy); In re A-1 Imperial Moving &
Storage Co., 350 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (in bankruptcy); In re Veiths, 9 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 943 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (in bankruptcy).
23. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972 version). For a full discussion of§ 9-402(7), see notes 109-
43 & accompanying text infra.
24. See, e.g., Fedders Financial Corp. v. Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Ham-
mons), 438 F. Supp. 1143, 1152-53 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (in bankruptcy); Continental Oil Co. v.
Citizens Trust & Say. Bank, 397 Mich. 203, 208-09, 244 N.W.2d 243, 244-45 (1976), a'g 57
Mich. App. 1, 225 N.W.2d 209 (1974); Fliegel v. Associates Capital Co. of Del., Inc., 272 Or.
434, 443-44, 537 P.2d 1144, 1148-49 (1975). For a case providing detailed analysis of § 9-
402(7), see Houchen v. First Nat'l Bank of Pana (In re Taylorville Eisner Agency, Inc.), 445
F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (in bankruptcy), discussed at notes 123-32 & accompanying text
March 1980] DEBTOR NAME CHANGE
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dens of existing and prospective secured creditors under the 1962 Code.
After discussing the shortcomings of the 1962 Code, the Note analyzes
subsection 9-402(7) which, although marred by latent ambiguities, gen-
erally succeeds in defining the burdens imposed on the parties involved
in a secured transaction.
The 1962 Code
Lacking specific direction from the 1962 Code, courts adopted an
ad hoc approach to cases involving a debtor's postperfection name or
identity change. Although the majority of courts reached the same
conclusion, i e., that the change did not affect the perfected security
interest, there existed little uniformity in the rationales underlying
these decisions. Many courts decided in favor of the secured party be-
cause the 1962 Code imposed no obligation to refile after the debtor's
name change.25 Several courts reached the same result through anal-
ogy to certain Code provisions and the policies they promote.26 Still
others, attempting to distinguish these inconsistent rationales and sup-
ply a new test, concluded that the time at which the secured party ac-
quired knowledge of the debtor's change was determinative of the
issue.2
7
This last approach received the greatest attention by the courts and
was the most popular among commentators.28 Under this approach, if
the secured party knew at the time of filing of the debtor's intention to
change in the future, but filed under the then current name, the financ-
25. Hamilton Bank v. ITT Diversified Credit Corp. (In re Tri-Cities Music Centers,
Inc.), 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 36 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (in bankruptcy); Fedders Financial Corp. v.
Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Hammons), 438 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (in
bankruptcy); In re The Grape Arbor, Inc., 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 632 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (in
bankruptcy); Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust & Sav. Bank, 397 Mich. 203, 244 N.W.2d
243 (1976).
26. Section 9-401(3) was used by several courts as a means of establishing the Code's
intention that prospective secured creditors of a debtor thoroughly investigate the debtor's
commercial history, thereby excusing the secured creditor from refiling after the debtor's
change. After establishing this proposition, the courts unanimously held the previously per-
fected security interest continued. Siljeg v. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 509 F.2d
1009 (9th Cir. 1975); Hamilton Bank v. ITT Diversified Credit Corp. (In re Tri-Cities Music
Centers, Inc.), 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 36 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (in bankruptcy); Fedders Financial
Corp. v. Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Hammons), 438 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Miss.
1977) (in bankruptcy); In re Gac, 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 412 (W.D. Mich. 1972) (in bank-
ruptcy).
27. See, e.g., Corwin v. RCA Corp. (In re Kittyhawk Television Corp.), 516 F.2d 24
(6th Cir. 1975) (in bankruptcy); Burnett v. H.O.U. Corp. (In re Kalamazoo Steel Process,
Inc.), 503 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1974) (in bankruptcy); Fedders Financial Corp. v. Borg
Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Hammons), 438 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (in bank-
ruptcy); Avdoyan v. Sun Bank at Pine Hills (In re Sofa Centres, Inc.), 18 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
536 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (in bankruptcy).
28. See cases cited note 27 supra.
[Vol. 31
ing statement would be held ineffective. Consequently, the secured
party's perfected interest would be deemed unperfected at the time of
the name or identity change.29 If, however, knowledge was acquired
after the filing,30 or was never acquired, 31 the original filing would be
held effective and the security interest perfected. The reason most com-
monly advanced for penalizing the secured party who acquired knowl-
edge of the debtor's intended name or identity change before filing was
that the secured party had received a "secret lien," thereby precluding
prospective secured parties from acquiring notice of the original secur-
ity interest.32 Because the acquisition of a secret lien impairs the effec-
tiveness of the Code's filing system and demonstrates commercial bad
faith,33 the courts reasoned that the secured party benefiting from the
29. Burnett v. H.O.U. Corp. (In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc.), 503 F.2d 1218 (6th
Cir. 1974) (in bankruptcy); King v. Willianis (In re Conger Printing Co., 18 U.C.C. REP.
SERv. 224 (D. Or. 1975) (in bankruptcy). But see Fliegel v. Associates Capital Co. of Del.,
Inc., 272 Or. 434, 537 P.2d 1144 (1975) (secured creditor's interest held perfected despite
secured creditor's knowledge, at the time of filing under debtor's former name, of debtor's
pre-filing incorporation).
30. Corwin v. RCA Corp. (In re Kittyhawk Television Corp.), 516 F.2d 24 (6th Cir.
1975) (in bankruptcy); Fedders Financial Corp. v. Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re
Hammons), 438 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (in bankruptcy); In re Gac, 11 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 412 (W.D. Mich. 1972) (in bankruptcy); Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust & Say.
Bank, 397 Mich. 203, 244 N.W.2d 243 (1976); First Security Bank of Utah v. Zions First
Nat'l Bank, 537 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1975). Contra, In re Veiths, Inc., 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 943
(E.D. Wis. 1971) (in bankruptcy).
31. Ryan v. Rolland, 434 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1970); Litton Indus. Credit Corp. v. Mul-
len (In re Smith-Whitehead, Inc.), 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 362 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (in bankruptcy); In
re The Grape Arbor, Inc., 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 632 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (in bankruptcy); Bank of
Va.-Central v. Taurus Constr., 30 N.C. App. 220, 226 S.E.2d 685, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 659,
228 S.E.2d 450 (1976).
32. The purpose of the notice filing system adopted by the Code is "to give notice to the
public, and to future creditors, that the assets of a debtor are encumbered. The evil to be
protected against is a secret lien against the assets of a debtor which might cause innocent
parties to extend credit to such debtor without knowledge of the prior lien. To allow one
creditor to have a secret lien would be a fraud on all other creditors." In re Veiths, Inc., 9
U.C.C. REP. SERV. 943, 947 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (in bankruptcy).
33. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit asserted in Burnett v. H.O.U. Corp. (In
re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc.), 503 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1974) (in bankruptcy), that
"[wjhen a secured party has knowledge at the time the security agreement is executed that
the debtor intends to change its name, and the new name is known to him, the secured party
must act in good faith to insure" accurateness of the financing statement. Id at 1222. Rely-
ing on the Code's definition of good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned," U.C.C. § 1-201(14) (1962 version), the court noted that "a realization that an-
other is unaware of something or does not understand it may be considered as not con-
forming to the good faith standard of the Code." 503 F.2d at 1222 (citing King, Policy
Decisions and Security Agreements under the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 WAYNE L. REv.
556, 561 (1963)) (footnote omitted). Similar reasoning was applied in King v. Williams (In
re Conger Printing Co.), 18 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 224 (D. Or. 1975) (in bankruptcy), where, as
in Kalamazoo, the security interest of a creditor who had known of the debtor's intended
name change when the security agreement was entered into was held to be unperfected as a
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knowledge should not have perfected status. Interestingly, this same
rationale was not applied to secured parties who had received knowl-
edge after the original filing.34 Apparently, the secured party's failure
to refile after learning of the change was not sufficiently deceptive to
constitute commercial bad faith.
Although this approach for determining whether a debtor's change
affects a creditor's interest under the 1962 Code may be desirable for its
ease of application, it suffers from two shortcomings. First, the ap-
proach in some respects is too broad, as it conceivably could be applied
when the secured creditor's knowledge of the debtor's change should be
irrelevant to the prospective secured creditor's investigative responsibil-
ities.35 Second, the approach fails to resolve problems of statutory con-
struction indigenous to certain kinds of changes by the debtor.
36
Consequently, application of the approach to all name or identity
change cases may result in either unjustifiable consequences for the se-
cured creditor or continued confusion over the impact of related Code
provisions.
Notably, none of the courts or commentators considering the
problems associated with the debtor's name or identity change distin-
guished the cases on the basis of the kinds and forms of the change;
37
instead, cases involving corporate name changes are relied on as au-
thority for cases concerned with the name change of a proprietorship,
38
which in turn are treated like cases involving intercorporate transfers,
corporate mergers, and consolidations. By considering and analyzing
the cases in terms of the kinds of changes involved, however, the dis-
tinct problems of each form of change and the precise inadequacies of
the 1962 Code can be identified.
result of the operation of the good faith requirement imposed by the Code, U.C.C. § 1-203
(1962 version), and the requirement under Article 9 of filing a financing statement which
identifies the debtor. 18 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 228.
34. See, e.g., Burnett v. H.O.U. Corp. (In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc.), 503 F.2d
1218 (6th Cir. 1974) (in bankruptcy), where the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
stricted the application of the good faith standard to creditors who had knowledge of the
debtor's intended change at the time of contracting or filing by stating that "[wle do not have
a case now before us requiring a determination of the responsibilities of a secured party
where he learns of a name change at a later time." Id at 1222. Conversely, in Corwin v.
RCA Corp. (In re Kittyhawk Television Corp.), 516 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1975) (in bankruptcy),
the same court refused to impose a duty to refile on a secured party who discovered the
debtor's change after it had occurred. Id at 27-28. Accord, Fedders Financial Corp. v. Borg
Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Hammons), 438 F. Supp. 1143, 1155 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (in
bankruptcy); Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust & Sav. Bank, 397 Mich. 203, 208-09, 244
N.W.2d 243, 244-45 (1976), af7'g 57 Mich. App. 1, 225 N.W.2d 209 (1974).
35. See notes 42-43 & accompanying text infra.
36. See notes 81-108 & accompanying text infra.
37. See, e.g., DAVENPORT & MURRAY, supra note 19, § 4.03(d).
38. See, e.g., Fedders Financial Corp. v. Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Ham-
mons), 438 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (in bankruptcy).
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Sole Proprietorship Name Changes
Part of the problem caused by the debtor's postperfection identity
change can be attributed to the 1962 Code's failure to specify the
proper name under which a secured party must file to perfect a security
interest in the debtor's property.39 As a result of this uncertainty, se-
cured parties often have filed under an incorrect designation of the
debtor's name,40 while prospective secured parties have been forced to
search under more than one possible name of the debtor.
41
Faced with the Code's silence, courts fashioned a duty on the part
of a secured party interested in perfecting a security interest in the
property of a sole proprietorship to file under the name of the individ-
ual proprietor or the name of the proprietorship when the latter resem-
bled or contained the name of the proprietor.42 This duty was created
in light of the ease with which the debtor could change the name of the
proprietorship, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the filed
financing statement indexed solely under the proprietorship name.
43
Hence, just as existing secured parties were expected to file under the
name of the individual proprietor, prospective secured parties were ex-
pected, in conformity with reasonable commercial practice, to search
under the individual proprietor's name when attempting to discover
encumbrances on the proprietorship property.
In theory, then, even a drastic change in the name of a proprietor-
ship should not prevent the original financing statement from supply-
39. The defect under the 1962 Code is cured by § 9-402(7) of the 1972 amendments to
the Code. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972 version). See notes 109-43 & accompanying text infra.
For a discussion of Miing under both the 1962 and 1972 versions of the Code, see DAVEN-
PORT & MURRAY, supra note 19, §§ 4.02-.03; HENSON, supra note 5, at 62-101.
40. See, e.g., Northern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re Leichter), 471 F.2d 785
(2d Cir. 1972) (in bankruptcy); Van Dusen Acceptance Corp. v. Gough (In re Thomas), 466
F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972) (in bankruptcy); Bank of Mississippi, Tupelo v. Pongetti (In re Hill),
363 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (in bankruptcy); In re Eichler, 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
1406 (E.D. Wis. 1971), a f'g 9 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1400 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (in bankruptcy). If
case law is indicative of general commercial practice, secured parties rarely fied under more
than one name of the debtor, although the 1962 Code did not preclude this. The propriety
of this "multiple" or "cross" indexing is recognized implicitly by § 9.403(5) of the 1972
amendments. See U.C.C. § 9-403(5) (1972 version).
41. See, e.g., In re McCoy, 330 F. Supp. 533 (D. Kan. 1971) (in bankruptcy).
42. See cases cited note 40 supra. Accord, In re Jones, 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 249 (W.D.
Mich. 1972) (in bankruptcy); In re Merrill, 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 757 (D. Neb. 1971) (in
bankruptcy).
43. HENSON, supra note 5, at 67. Obviously, if the proprietor changes his or her indi-
vidual name, the problem is exacerbated. See, e.g., In re Gac, 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 412
(W.D. Mich. 1972) (in bankruptcy), where a filing under the individual debtor's name was
held sufficient to perfect a security interest in the debtor's property despite a subsequent
divorce and simultaneous name change of the debtor. The court in Gac concluded that the
duty of the prospective creditor to conduct a thorough search of the debtor's identity out-
weighed the duty of the secured creditor to refile upon the debtor's name change. Id at 415.
March 1980]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ing sufficient notice of a prior security interest to prospective secured
parties of the proprietorship. Although only one case appears to have
addressed the effect of a proprietorship name change under the 1962
Code,4 4 the holding of the case conforms to the conclusion reached
above, ie., the debtor's name change was insufficient grounds either to
find the security interest unperfected or to establish a duty for the se-
cured party to file a new or amended financing statement.
This analysis establishes one instance in which the existing secured
party's knowledge of the debtor's change does not put that party in a
more advantageous position than a prospective secured party. In this
instance, the secured party's knowledge and failure to refile do not im-
pede the prospective secured party from discovering the existence of
the perfected security interest. As a result, the knowledge of the se-
cured party, whenever acquired, should not alter the filing obligations
of the secured party or the investigative obligations of the prospective
secured party. This does not imply, however, that secured creditors
may never gain a secret lien in the property of a sole proprietorship by
virtue of a change. To the contrary, as will be seen in analyzing those
cases involving the incorporation of sole proprietorships,45 a real dan-
ger of creating a secret lien exists.
Corporate and Partnership Name Changes
The cases involving corporate or partnership name changes pres-
ent a new difficulty. In large part this results from the requirement that
a financing statement fied to perfect a security interest in either corpo-
rate or partnership assets identify the debtor by the corporate 46 or part-
nership47 name, respectively. Consequently, a significant 48 change of
name by either of these two business enterprises renders a filed financ-
ing statement ineffective for notifying prospective secured parties of
prior encumbrances. Prospective secured parties of either of these en-
terprises thus have a greater investigative liability than do prospective
44. In re McCoy, 330 F. Supp. 533 (D. Kan. 1971) (in bankruptcy) (debtor named Carl
Lee McCoy changed trade name from McCoy Furniture and Appliance to McCoy's Dis-
count Furniture Warehouse). Notably, in this case the debtor's former and subsequent trade
names were similar, thereby rendering the change arguably non-misleading to prospective
secured creditors. Nonetheless, given the requirement of filing under the individual debtor's
name, the similarity of the former and successor names appears wholly irrelevant.
45. See notes 81-108 & accompanying text infra.
46. See DAVENPORT & MURRAY, supra note 19, at 131; HENSON, supra note 5, at 66.
47. See DAVENPORT & MURRAY, supra note 19, at 131.
48. The requirement of "significance" derives from § 9-402(5), discussed at note 15
supra, which renders ineffective only those financing statements which, inter alia, fail to give
prospective secured creditors of the debtor adequate notice. If the name change is insignifi-
cant, thereby continuing the original financing statement's notice value, the change would
not be seriously misleading. U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1962 version).
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secured parties of a sole proprietorship. Because the corporate and
partnership name changes present essentially the same problems, the
following discussion is applicable to both. The following analysis, for
the sake of simplicity, is phrased in terms of the more commonly liti-
gated49 corporate name change.
The relevant corporate name change cases here are those made by
an amendment to the corporate articles, 50 charter,51 or certificate of in-
corporation.52 Because a significant corporate name change prevents
the filed financing statement from notifying prospective secured parties
of outstanding security interests in the debtor's property, there is little
chance that a prospective secured creditor will be able to claim a supe-
rior right in the debtor's property.5 3 As most courts have refused to
alter the perfected status of the prior security interest, the secured credi-
tor effectively is immune from superior claims.
The secured creditor's immunity might be attacked, however,
through reliance on both the Code requirement that a financing state-
ment not be seriously misleading to prospective secured creditors54 and
the secured creditor's ultimate responsibility for filing the financing
49. The only known partnership name change case is Fedders Financial Corp. v. Borg
Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Hammons), 438 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (in bank-
ruptcy). The corporate and partnership name change cases differ primarily with respect to
the availability of public records by which the original names of the debtor could be verified.
In the case of a corporation, the original name of the corporation must be contained in the
articles or certificate of incorporation, as prescribed by statute. It is also a common statutory
requirement that any corporate name change be contained in the articles or certificate. See
18 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 145 (1965); 6 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d § 74:100 (1972). In
the case of partnerships, the requirements for initial public registration of the partnership's
name and reregistration upon a subsequent name change are not so clear.
50. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust &'Sav. Bank, 397 Mich. 203, 244
N.W.2d 243 (1976), af'g 57 Mich. App. 1, 225 N.W.2d 209 (1974).
51. See, e.g., Burnett v. H.O.U. Corp. (In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc.), 503 F.2d
1218 (6th Cir. 1974) (in bankruptcy); Hamilton Bank v. ITT Diversified Credit Corp. (In re
Tri-Cities Music Centers, Inc.), 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 36 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (in bankruptcy).
52. In re Pasco Sales Co., 77 Misc. 2d 724, 354 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 52 A.D.2d 138, 383 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1976). Other cases which involve corporate name
changes are In re A-I Imperial Moving & Storage Co., 350 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. Fla. 1972)
(in bankruptcy); In re The Grape Arbor, Inc., 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 632 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (in
bankruptcy).
These formal name change cases should be distinguished from those involving transfer
of the collateral, discussed at text accompanying notes 81-108 infra.
53. This is a consequence of the Code's "first to file or perfect" rule. Prospective se-
cured creditors intending to finance the debtor in exchange for a purchase money security
interest in the debtor's collateral had a particular problem as § 9-312(3) of the 1962 Code
required secured creditors with perfected security interests in the debtor's inventory to re-
ceive notice of the intended refinancing. For a case involving this problem, see Fedders
Financial Corp. v. Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Hammons), 438 F. Supp. 1143
(S.D. Miss. 1977) (in bankruptcy), discussed at note 78 infra.
54. U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1962 version); U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1972 version).
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statement. 55 Under this reasoning, the court in In reA-i ImperialMov-
ing & Storage Co. ,56 held that the corporate debtor's name change "in-
validated" the secured creditor's perfected security interest for the
period during which prospective secured creditors could have been
misled by the financing statement. The court viewed this result as par-
ticularly appropriate in light of the ease with which the secured creditor
could have examined the corporate articles recorded with the Secretary
of State and presumably refiled upon discovery of the debtor's
change.
57
The unusual result achieved in A-i Imperial Moving is difficult to
justify, particularly in light of that secured creditor's ignorance of the
debtor's name change. The court's holding implicitly imposed on the
secured creditor, first, a duty to maintain knowledge of the debtor's
identity after perfection, and second, a duty to refile if the debtor effects
a seriously misleading name change. The former duty, constant moni-
toring of the debtor, might be justified on the ground that the secured
creditor has a closer relationship and hence closer contact with the
debtor than the prospective secured party.58 Consequently, the burden
and expense of monitoring the identity of the debtor, presumably by
resort to public records and like sources of information, arguably
should be on the secured creditor. Considering, however, both the sub-
stantial expense imposed on the existing secured creditor and the need
for prospective secured creditors to conduct only a single search of the
55. See notes 12-15 & accompanying text supra.
56. 350 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (in bankruptcy).
57. Id at 1189. The facts in A-1 Imperial Moving provide a good example of the ex-
treme case in which a debtor conceivably could change its name for the sole purpose of
acquiring refinancing on previously encumbered property. Initially, the corporate debtor
changed its name from "A-I Imperial Moving and Storage, Co., Inc.," under which a financ-
ing statement had been filed, to "6105 Corporation." Nine months later, the corporation
changed its name back to its original designation. Both name changes were unknown to the
secured party. In the subsequent bankruptcy proceedings, the court held that the original
name change rendered the financing statement seriously misleading under § 9-402(5) and
that therefore the security interest was no longer perfected. On appeal, the district court
used a more technical approach to achieve a similar result. The court concluded that the
initial name change "invalidated" the financing statement for the period the corporation
operated under the name "6105 Corporation," since it was during this period that prospec-
tive secured creditors would be most seriously misled. The second name change, however,
had the effect of breathing life into the previously invalidated financing statement, since the
second name change cured the problem created by the first name change. Hence, for the
period of time following the second name change, the originally perfected security interest,
which had been "invalidated," became "reperfected." 350 F. Supp. at 1189.
The court's holding is important despite the fact that the security interest ultimately was
held perfected. Presumably, had the debtor given a second creditor a security interest in its
property during the "ineffective" period of the financing statement, the second secured cred-
itor would have had a claim superior to that of the original secured creditor.
58. This point was suggested in Levenberg, Comments on Certain ProposedAmendments
to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 MINN. L. REv. 117, 129 (1972).
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same public records,59 the district court in A-1 Imperial Moving im-
posed an undue burden on secured creditors.
The second requirement implicitly imposed in 4-1 Imperial Mov-
ing, a duty to refile if the secured creditor becomes aware of the
debtor's name change, appears easier to justify. In such a case, the se-
cured party should be aware that the filed financing statement no
longer serves notice of the perfected security interest. In Continental Oil
Co. v. Citizens Trust & Savings Bank,60 one of the few cases addressing
this issue, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that, despite the se-
cured creditor's acquired knowledge, the name change did not affect
the perfected status of the secured interest.6 ' Justices Williams and
Kavanaugh dissented, arguing that the creditor's failure to attempt to
file a new financing statement once knowledge of the debtor's change
was acquired constituted a breach of the good faith requirement im-
posed by the Code.6 2 In reaching its conclusion, the dissent relied on
Burnett v. HO. U. Corp. (In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc.).63 In
Kalamazoo, the corporate-debtor's name change was held to terminate
the secured creditor's perfected security interest because the secured
creditor knew of the debtor's anticipated change at the time of the
original filing. Although the secured creditor in Continental Oil
learned of the debtor's change after the original filing, the dissent in-
sisted that there was
no reason why the policy of preventing secret liens manifest in [sec-
tion 9-402] ... and the good faith obligation set out in [section 1-
203] .. .should not require the same result [as that reached in
Kalamazoo] where the secured party has actual knowledge of a sub-
sequent change in the debtor's name, and where that name change is
"seriously misleading." 4
In essence, the dissent in Continental Oil implied that when the
59. The cost to search the financing statements or amendments to the articles of incor-
poration on hand with the office of the Secretary of State varies among the different jurisdic-
tions. In California, a search of the financing statements costs either $3.00 or $4.00, while a
search of the articles of incorporation costs $4.00. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9403(5) (West
Supp. 1979). Since the debtor conceivably could change its name an unlimited number of
times, the corresponding cost to the secured creditor to thoroughly search for the present
identity of the debtor could be substantial. On the other hand, prospective secured creditors
would have to conduct the same search only once, ite., when considering extending credit to
the debtor. The burden would be even greater in the case of partnerships, where a public
record may not be available. In this latter case the prospective secured creditor would only
have to request the debtor's personal records at the beginning of negotiations; it thus would
seem more reasonable to impose the burden on the prospective secured creditor.
60. 397 Mich. 203, 244 N.W.2d 243 (1976).
61. Id. at 209-10, 244 N.W.2d at 245.
62. Id at 210-17, 244 N.W.2d at 245-48.
63. 503 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1974) (in bankruptcy). See note 33 supra for a discussion of
the Kalamazoo rationale.
64. 397 Mich. at 220, 244 N.W.2d at 250.
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secured creditor knows of the debtor's name change, regardless of when
this knowledge is acquired, the secured creditor's responsibility to refile
is invariably greater than the prospective secured creditor's obligation
to learn of the perfected security interest through sources other than the
financing statement.65 Certainly the danger of creating a secret lien in
favor of the secured creditor is the same whether the secured creditor
knows of the debtor's change before or after it has occurred: in both
cases the financing statement does not sufficiently alert prospective se-
cured creditors to the existing encumbrance on the corporate prop-
erty.66 Assuming this is the case, however, one must still consider
whether the prospective secured creditor's investigative responsibilities
are limited to a search of the financing statements. The conclusion
reached by the Continental Oil dissent certainly suggests that it is so
limited.
In In re Pasco Sales Co. ,67 on the other hand, this conclusion was
explicitly rejected. The court instead held, in accord with the Continen-
tal Oil majority, that the secured creditor's perfected security interest
remains unaffected "regardless of whether the secured party had
knowledge of the change of name. '68 In placing the greater responsi-
bility on the prospective secured creditor, the court in Pasco empha-
sized that the Code's notice filing system was never intended to be the
sole source of information to be relied on by the prospective secured
party, but rather " 'a startingpoint for investigation which will result in
fair warning concerning the transaction contemplated.' "69 Hence, the
court in Pasco concluded that even though the corporate name change
may have eliminated the notice value of the financing statement, im-
posing a duty for the prospective creditor "[t]o inquire of any change of
name, especially where the filed certfiocation of incorporation has been
65. The dissent noted that "a contrary conclusion would disrupt the simple and work-
able filing system envisioned by the drafters of the Code, and create unnecessary uncertainty
and delay in the contracting of security agreement[s] to secure the loans which are often so
vital to success in the business world." Id at 215-16, 244 N.W.2d at 248.
66. The dissent in Continental Oil reached its conclusion only after recognizing that
"there would be no great burden [on the secured creditor] in moving to refile or amend its
financing statement .... '" Id at 217,244 N.W.2d at 248. This is not entirely true, as under
the 1962 Code the debtor's signature was required on all financing statements. Hence, a
debtor's refusal to sign a new financing statement would prevent its being filed. The dissent
answered this by requiring only that the secured creditor make a good faith "attempt" to
refile; should the debtor refuse to sign the new financing statement, the secured creditor's
burden would be fulfilled. This problem has been eliminated by the 1972 amendments,
which require only the creditor's signature on a financing statement if "it is filed to perfect a
security interest in . . . collateral acquired after a change of name, identity or corporate
structure of the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-402(2) (1972 version).
67. 77 Misc. 2d 724, 354 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1974), rey'don other grounds, 52 A.D.2d 138,
383 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1976).
68. 77 Misc. 2d at 726, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
69. Id at 727, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
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amended to effect such a change, imposes no greater burden than is
already contemplated under the Code."
70
As the Pasco decision indicates, the Code contains several provi-
sions which suggest that the prospective secured creditor's investigative
burden involves more than a mere search of recorded financing state-
ments. The court referred to section 9-401(3), which states that the
financing statement remains effective despite the debtor's change of res-
idence, place of business, or use of the collateral.71 Because these
changes conceivably could mislead prospective secured creditors, the
section logically implies that "[i]t was not intended. . . that interested
parties be completely absolved from any inquiry as to the past history
of the debtor."72 Similarly, section 9-20873 provides a device by which
a debtor may force a secured creditor to disclose information needed by
a prospective secured party. This provision, not referred to in the
Pasco opinion, is further evidence that the Code does not contemplate
that a prospective secured creditor will rely solely on information de-
rived from the financing statement.74
Two additional practical considerations support the conclusion
reached in Pasco. First, because the financing statement contains little
more than a designation of the type of collateral secured, a prudent
prospective creditor interested in securing presently encumbered tangi-
ble property should be convinced of the debtor's possession of the col-
lateral.75 This assurance cannot be acquired by a mere review of the
financing statement, but rather may require physical inspection of the
collateral. Moreover, once the prospective secured party has located
the collateral, title to the property still must be investigated before the
prospective secured creditor is guaranteed priority in the event of a
conflict in security interests. To the extent that reasonable commercial
practice demands this type of investigation, the filed financing state-
ment is not intended as an exclusive source of information for a pro-
spective secured creditor concerned about prior perfected security
interests. Second, the Code requires the prospective secured creditor to
70. Id (emphasis added).
71. U.C.C. § 9-401(3) (1962 version).
72. 77 Misc. 2d at 727, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
73. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1962 version).
74. Arguably, the operation of both §§ 9-401(3) and 9-208 assumes that the prospective
secured party, at a minimum, has received from a reading of the financing statement some
notice of the name of the debtor or of the existence of a perfected security interest. In the
corporate name change cases, not even this minimum notice was available. Indeed, the
efficacy of the notice filing system in general is highly suspect if the financing statement is
not acknowledged as the ultimate means of receiving notice of a perfected security interest.
75. For a discussion of suggested steps in investigating a prospective debtor, see DAV-
ENPORT & MURRAY, supra note 19, § 4.03(c).
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make sure that non-Code, statutorily created liens76 do not encumber
the collateral, as these statutory liens may be superior to any security
interest created by filing under the Code. 77 Again, the existence of such
statutory liens would not be discovered through searching the financing
statements.
Despite the persuasiveness of the arguments presented in Pasco
and the Code provisions impliedly favoring a greater duty on the part
of the prospective secured creditor, the 1962 Code provides no conclu-
sive resolution to the problem posed by corporate name changes. Even
assuming that the prospective secured creditor should conduct a thor-
ough investigation of the debtor's history before extending credit to the
debtor,78 it is difficult to dismiss the argument presented by the dissent
in Continental Oil that a secured creditor who knows of the debtor's
change and takes no remedial action is not acting in good faith.79 Un-
fortunately, because the 1962 Code failed to provide an adequate solu-
tion to the corporate name change problem, the courts had no uniform
means of determining the existing and prospective secured creditor's
burdens under the Code. Absent adoption of the 1972 amendments to
Article 9,80 the distribution of those burdens remains a difficult prob-
lem.
Incorporation and Intercorporate Transfer Cases
The third category of cases involves, at least superficially, more
than a mere name change by the debtor. These cases involve either
incorporations of proprietorships or partnerships, 8' transfers of encum-
76. See id
77. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-310 (1962 version).
78. It is difficult to reconcile the Code's promotion of the notice filing system and re-
suits in the majority of cases, which do not place a premium on the notice received from
filed financing statements. Fedders Financial Corp. v. Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. (In
re Hammons), 438 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (in bankruptcy), shows the minimal
importance which may be attached to the notice supplied by the financing statements. In
Hammons, General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC), a purchase money secured party,
discovered the identities of prior creditors without resort to the financing statements. In-
deed, GECC had searched under the debtor's new name and had discovered no outstanding
security interests. The court nonetheless held GECC had an unperfected security interest
since it had failed to notify prior creditors of its intended encumbrances, as required by
U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1962 version). Although the result in Hammons may be sound, it indi-
cates how little significance a search of the financing statements may have.
79. See Errors and Changes in the Debtor's Name, supra note 15, at 156-62.
80. See notes 113-21 & accompanying text infra.
81. Ryan v. Rolland, 434 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1970) (in bankruptcy); Litton Indus.
Credit Corp. v. Mullen (In re Smith-Whitehead, Inc.), 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 362 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
(in bankruptcy); Avdoyan v. Sun Bank at Pine Hills (In re Sofa Centre, Inc.), 18 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 536 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (in bankruptcy); In re Veiths, Inc., 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
943 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (in bankruptcy); Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Bank of Mann, 36
Cal. App. 3d 286, 111 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1973); Bank of Va.-Central v. Taurus Constr. Co., 30
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bered property between sibling corporations, 82 corporate mergers,83 or
corporate sales.84 All are more "identity" 85 than "name" changes.
Each of these changes has two significant features. First, the change
renders the filed financing statement an ineffective means of notifying
prospective secured creditors of the successor enterprise of existing per-
fected security interests. Second, the entity change entails a transfer of
the prior enterprise's assets to the successor enterprise. The problems
posed by the first feature of these identity changes are identical to the
problems discussed in the section dealing with corporate name change
cases.86 Thus, the discussion in this section focuses on the problems
posed by the second feature, namely, the transfer of assets between ini-
tial and successor enterprises.
87
The transfer of encumbered assets occurring in these cases impli-
cates Code sections88 which were neither referred to nor relevant in the
conventional name change cases. The primary additional section, 9-
306(2),89 provides that a security interest continues to exist in collateral
"notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition 90 thereof by the
N.C. App. 220, 226 S.E.2d 685, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 659, 228 S.E.2d 450 (1976); Fliegel v.
Associates Capital Co. of Del., Inc., 272 Or. 434, 537 P.2d 1144 (1975).
82. Corwin v. RCA Corp. (In re Kittyhawk Television Corp.), 516 F.2d 24 (6th Cir.
1975) (in bankruptcy), rev'g 383 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Ohio 1974); American Heritage Bank &
Trust Co. v. 0. & E. Inc., 576 P.2d 566 (Colo. App. 1978); First Security Bank of Utah v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank 537 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1975).
83. Siljeg v. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 509 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1975);
Inter Mountain Ass'n of Credit Men v. Villager, Inc., 527 P.2d 664 (Utah 1974).
84. King v. Williams (In re Conger Printing Co.), 18 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 224 (D. Or.
1975) (in bankruptcy).
85. "Identity transfer" is used in this Note to refer to a disposition of the collateral to a
successor enterprise which is owned and controlled by the original debtor entity. "Third
party transfer" refers to a disposition to an independent third party.
86. See notes 46-79 & accompanying text supra.
87. The transfers which took place in the various cases were often in different forms. In
the incorporation cases, the transfer of the encumbered assets to the newly formed corpora-
tion was made either in consideration for the corporation's assumption of the obligation, see,
e.g., Ryan v. Rolland, 434 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1970) (in bankruptcy); Bank of Va.-Central v.
Taurus Constr. Co., 30 N.C. App. 220,226 S.E.2d 685, cer. denied, 290 N.C. 659,228 S.E.2d
450 (1976); or in exchange for corporate shares, see, e.g., In re Veiths, 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
943 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (in bankruptcy). In the merger cases, the transfer of assets either was
made in consideration for the newly formed corporate shares, see, e.g., Inter Mountain Ass'n
of Credit Men v. Villagers, Inc., 527 P.2d 664 (Utah 1974); or merely as a bookkeeping
device, see, e.g., First Security Bank of Utah v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 537 P.2d 1024 (Utah
1975).
88. See note 94 infra.
89. Section 9-306(2) of the 1962 Code provides: "Except where this Article otherwise
provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other
disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action was authorized by the secured party in the
security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including
collections received by the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1962 version).
90. The terms "disposition" and "exchange" are not defined in the Code. "Sale" is
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debtor unless his action was authorized by the securedparty in the security
agreement or otherwise. . "..",91 The courts' reference to this section is
surprising in these cases, since this section has been applied more fre-
quently in cases in which the collateral had been sold or exchanged by
the debtor to a third party.92 Nevertheless, trustees in bankruptcy and
prospective secured creditors of the successor enterprise have urged
section 9-306(2) as a means of terminating the perfected security inter-
est in collateral transferred in an identity change on the ground that the
secured creditor knew of the identity change and therefore had author-
ized the transfer.
By the very nature of this argument, section 9-306(2) was relied on
only in those cases in which the secured creditor's knowledge of the
change, and hence an authorization, could be established. In cases
where no such proof existed, the section obviously was of no assistance
to the prospective secured creditor. Although resort to section 9-306(2)
had the apparent advantage of grounding the claims of the prospective
secured creditor in the precise language of the Code, virtually all courts
considering the argument refused to terminate the secured creditors'
perfected security interest.93 Instead, the courts consistently held that
there had been no authorization within the meaning of section 9-
306(2).94
defined in § 2-106(1), as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." U.C.C.
§ 2-106(1) (1962 version).
91. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1962 version) (emphasis added).
92. For a list of cases in which § 9-306(2) was considered in a context other than an
"entity" or "identity" change, see Corwin v. RCA Corp. (In re Kittyhawk Television Corp.),
383 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (in bankruptcy).
93. The exceptional cases were King v. Williams (In re Conger Printing Co.), 18 U.C.C
REP. SERV. 224 (D. Or. 1975) (in bankruptcy), and In re Veiths, Inc., 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
943 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (in bankruptcy). In Peiths, the court indicated that the authorization
demanded by § 9-306(2) was satisfied by a finding that the individual debtor's incorporation
was made with the secured party's "knowledge or consent." In turn, the creditor's knowl-
edge and consent was established by the creditor's receipt of, inter alia, (1) a new promissory
note after the debtor's incorporation and (2) a corporate resolution which stated that the new
corporation had authority to borrow funds from the creditor. But cf Corwin v. RCA Corp.
(In re Kittyhawk Television Corp.), 516 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1975) (in bankruptcy), rev'g 383 F.
Supp. 691 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (court held that § 9-306(2) was inapplicable to an intercorporate
transfer, despite secured creditor's consent to debtor's incorporation and subsequent receipt
of new promissory notes signed by successor enterprise). Interestingly, § 9-402(7) of the
1972 amendments to Article 9 provides that "[a] financing statement remains effective with
respect to collateral transferred by the debtor even though the secured party knows of or
consents to the transfer." U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972 version) (emphasis added).
94. The secured creditor's consent before or after the transfer was held not to be an
authorization where the security agreement contained a clause which provided that the obli-
gation of the original debtor was binding on the debtor's assigns or "successors." Fliegel v.
Associates Capital of Del., Inc., 272 Or. 434, 537 P.2d 1144 (1975); Inter Mountain Ass'n of
Credit Men v. Villager, Inc., 527 P.2d 664 (Utah 1974). Cf. King v. Williams (In re Conger
Printing Co.), 18 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 224 (D. Or. 1975) (in bankruptcy) (secured creditor's
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In Corwin v. RCA Corp. (In re Kitlyhawk Television Corp.),95 the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals went beyond this position, concluding
instead that section 9-306(2) essentially is inapplicable to identity
change cases. In Kityhawk, the original debtor entity, Kittyhawk
Broadcasting Corporation, transferred its encumbered assets to a suc-
cessor corporation named Kittyhawk Television Corporation. RCA,
the secured creditor of the transferor corporation, was notified immedi-
ately of the transfer. Both the original and successor corporations had
the same shareholders, management, and directors.96 The district
court, reasoning that the transfer of assets took place between "two en-
tities which the law regards as separate," 97 held that section 9-306(2)
demanded the termination of RCA's perfected security interest in the
transferred assets.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit court reversed. Refusing to apply sec-
tion 9-306(2), the court held that the transfer of assets, although osten-
sibly a "disposition" within the meaning of section 9-306(2),
substantively was "no more than a change of name by the debtor inso-
far as the filing requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code are
concerned." 98 After noting that the initial and successor entities were
identical99 and the ease with which a corporate name change would
have accomplished the same commercial objective as the transfer,1co
the court concluded that the transfer was equivalent to a non-mislead-
ing name change by the debtor corporation. Accordingly, the transfer
knowledge of and consent to debtor's incorporation before transfer held not to be authoriza-
tion of the transfer under § 9-306(2), although such consent without refiling constituted bad
faith under the Code). In cases where no authorization was alleged, the courts pointed out
that, although the debtor has the right to transfer the encumbered assets, U.C.C. § 9-311
(1962 version), the transfer must be authorized under § 9-306(2) for the creditor's security
interest to terminate in the collateral. Ryan v. Rolland, 434 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1970) (in
bankruptcy); American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E., Inc., 576 P.2d 566 (Colo.
App. 1978); Bank of Va.-Central v. Taurus Constr. Co., 30 N.C. App. 220, 226 S.E.2d 605,
cert. denied, 290 N.C. 659, 228 S.E.2d 450 (1976).
95. 516 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1975) (in bankruptcy), rev~' 383 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Ohio
1974).
96. Identity of ownership and control of both the prior and successor enterprises was
an earmark of virtually all the cases within this third category. This identity between the
debtor-transferor and the transferee enterprise was a significant factor in the courts' refusal
to apply § 9-306(2).
97. 383 F. Supp. at 693.
98. 516 F.2d at 26.
99. The court noted that because of the "complete identity of ownership and control of
the two corporations, the assumption of liabilities and transfer of assets could hardly be
treated as the kind of sale, exchange or disposition contemplated ... by [§ 9-306(2)]." 516
F.2d at 26.
100. The purpose of the transfer in Xittyhawk was to separate the original corporation's
radio and television operations. The court insisted that the same separation could have been
achieved by renaming the original entity, issuing new stock, and transferring the unencum-
bered property to a subsequently formed new corporation. 516 F.2d at 26-27.
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was held not to affect RCA's perfected security interest in the corporate
assets. 10 1
The strength of the conclusion reached in Kittyhawk is that it en-
forces the principle of fairness. The effect of the identity change was
fundamentally the same as that resulting from a conventional corporate
name change. The court therefore concluded that the prospective se-
cured parties of the successor enterprise should not have available to
them a weapon, in the form of section 9-306(2), which prospective se-
cured parties of newly named corporations could not wield.
The difficulty with the court's conclusion, however, is that it was
based on the identity of the initial and successor debtor enterprises (the
transferor and the transferee) and not on the purposes for which section
9-306(2) originally was intended. Indeed, examination of the cases
considering section 9-306(2) amply demonstrates that the section was
not intended, and generally has not been used, to cure what are essen-
tially insufficiencies in the financing statement. 10 2 Analysis of this sec-
tion shows that its purpose is not to protect prospective secured parties
of the transferee but rather to afford protection to the transferor's se-
cured creditor and to the transferee of the collateral in a sale of inven-
tory. Section 9-306(2) first insures that innocent transferee-purchasers
of the debtor-transferor's inventory will not be subject to claims of
those secured creditors having a perfected security interest in the inven-
tory who previously authorized the disposition of the inventory.
0 3
Section 9-306(2) also operates to give the secured creditor a perfected
security interest in the proceeds resulting from the sale or exchange of
the debtor's inventory, collateral which the secured creditor knew
would be sold."°4 Any resulting protection of the transferee's prospec-
tive secured creditors is incidental to the protection intended for the
innocent inventory purchaser and secured creditor. Indeed, as most
identity transfers do not result in the original debtor entity having
101. Id at 29.
102. See Corwin v. RCA Corp. (In re Kittyhawk Television Corp.), 383 F. Supp. 691
(S.D. Ohio 1974) (in bankruptcy), rep'd, 516 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1975). (citing cases).
103. "Accordingly, after sale of inventory, the secured party must rely exclusively on a
security interest in proceeds, since his interest will not continue in the collateral after sale
under § 9-306(2)." DAVENPORT & MURRAY, supra note 19, at 79. It logically follows that
"except in the case of inventory transactions, most secured parties explicitly prohibit their
debtors from selling collateral until the underlying obligation is satisfied." Levenberg, Com-
ments on Certain Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 56
MINN. L. REv. 117, 127 (1972). The objective of § 9-306(2) is not to protect the purchaser's
prospective secured creditors from secret liens but "to protect the buying public in cases in
which the secured party finances inventory which is sold to the public by the debtor in the
regular course of the debior's business." McFadden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
260 Md. 601, 624, 273 A.2d 198, 209 (1971) (emphasis added).
104. This is evidenced by the title to § 9-306 of the 1962 Code: Proceeds; Rights of the
Secured Party on Disposition of Collateral. U.C.C. § 9-306 (1962 version).
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"proceeds" from the disposition, 0 5 resort to section 9-306(2) appears
dubious. Hence, although the identity and inventory transfer cases
may produce similar consequences regarding the financing statement,
analysis of the policies behind section 9-306(2) suggests that application
of the section to the identity transfer cases does not promote these poli-
cies. 106
Despite these policy considerations, there is no truly conclusive
means of establishing that section 9-306(2) is not appropriately applied
in identity transfer cases brought under the 1962 Code.107 Moreover,
given the various potential forms of transfers, it may be difficult to dis-
tinguish between dispositions of collateral to independent third parties
and to successor enterprises of the debtor.'08 Applying the Kit'thawk
105. Difficulties arise regarding the "formal" transfer in which no tangible proceeds are
received for the assets which are the subject of the transfer. See, e.g., Ryan v. Rolland, 434
F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1970) (in bankruptcy) (debtor transferred encumbered assets in exchange
for corporation's assumption of liability); First Security Bank of Utah v. Zions First Nat'l
Bank, 537 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1975) (debtor transferred assets to sister corporation for book-
keeping purposes only).
106. But see Corwin v. RCA Corp. (In re Kittyhawk Television Corp.), 383 F. Supp. 691
(S.D. Ohio 1974) (in bankruptcy), rep'd, 516 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1975), where the district court
rejected any material distinction between an identity transfer and third party transfer and
emphasized the authorization of the disposition as being determinative of the section's appli-
cability. In applying § 9-306(2), the court summarized the purposes and objective of § 9-
306(2), apparently ignoring the inapplicability of the "purchaser's" interest: "This is an area
of competing interests among three types of interested parties. The secured creditor wishes
protection from the sale of collateral by the debtor which he did not authorize. Thepur-
chaser wishes protection from the secured creditor in sales of collateral which were authorized.
Creditors wish protection from secret liens on the property of the bankrupt. The court is of
the opinion that § 9-306(2) protects each interest by its exact terms. If the debtor is not
authorized to sell the collateral, then the secured creditor continues to have a security inter-
est in the collateral and any proceeds received by the debtor. If the secured creditor autho-
rizes the sale of the collateral, then the security interest continues only in the proceeds. But
should the secured creditor wish to continue the security interest in the collateral in the
hands of the purchaser, a new security agreement and financing statement must be prepared
and filed. This is a new security interest which does not arise from the operation of § 9-
306(2) and therefore must comply with the usual filing requirements of Article Nine. Only
in this manner can competing creditors be protected from secret liens. This too is an interest
Article Nine seeks to protect." 383 F. Supp. at 694-95 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in In re Veiths, 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 943, 948 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (in bank-
ruptcy), the court ignored the third party's interest and emphasized that the secured credi-
tor's authorization of the transfer of the collateral, regardless of its form, was the factor
which determined whether § 9-306(2) was to apply.
107. Commentators have stated that the cases considering the application of § 9-306(2)
to the identity transfer cases "do not. . . supply a satisfactory rule for practice; their ration-
ale is frequently narrow." DAVENPORT & MURRAY, supra note 19, at 166 (footnote omit-
ted).
108. See, e.g., American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E.; Inc., 576 P.2d 566 (Colo.
App. 1978), where the original debtor corporation was taken over by a junior lienor to whom
the original debtor had defaulted. Subsequently, the lienor transferred the assets to a new
corporation. This appears to be distinguishable from the typical incorporation case, or even
March 1980]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
rationale consistently in such cases would be extremely difficult. As the
following discussion demonstrates, section 9-402(7) of the 1972 amend-
ments, although arguably unclear in some respects, may help resolve
the uncertainty under the 1962 Code by supplying needed guidelines
for the application of section 9-306(2).
Significantly, the previous grouping of cases is not intended as a
means of establishing an absolute duty on the secured party to refile in
the event he or she discovers a postperfection name or identity change
by the debtor, although refiling certainly would be helpful to prospec-
tive secured creditors. Nor does this approach attempt to impose on
the prospective secured creditor a duty to investigate the history or
background of an intended debtor more thoroughly, even when such
investigation likely would result in avoidance of the problem entirely.
Rather, by analyzing the cases under the 1962 Code in light of the types
of changes effected by the debtor, both the inadequacies of the 1962
Code and the essential problems posed by a debtor's postperfection
name or identity change become most apparent.
Section 9-402(7) of the 1972 Amendments
Section 9-402(7) of the 1972 amendments to Article 9 is an attempt
to balance the interests and burdens of existing and prospective secured
parties. The significance of section 9-402(7) is highlighted by consider-
ing its operation in the context of the various kinds of changes that may
be effectuated by the debtor.
Sole Proprietorship Name Changes
One improvement the new section offers over the 1962 Code is an
explicit direction to secured creditors regarding the name under which
the financing statement ought to be filed. The first sentence of the
three-sentence section provides that "[a] financing statement suffi-
ciently shows the name of the debtor if it gives the individual, partner-
ship or corporate name of the debtor, whether or not it adds other trade
names or names of partners."' 0 9 This sentence essentially codifies the
rule of practice developed by the courts under the 1962 Code. 10 The
analysis provided in the prior section concerning proprietorship name
changes therefore is fully applicable to the 1972 Code. Consequently,
barring a change of name by the individual proprietor,"' l even a radi-
the intercorporate transfer cases where both the prior and successor enterprises are owned
and controlled consistently by the same party.
109. The problems caused by filing under the name of the partnership, as opposed to the
names of the individual partners, discussed in note 49 supra, have not been cured by the new
section.
110. See notes 39-45 & accompanying text supra.
111. See note 43 supra.
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cal change in the business name of a sole proprietorship does not affect
a perfected security interest in the proprietorship's property.
112
Corporate and Partnership Name Changes
To resolve the problem caused by a significant change in either a
partnership or corporate name, section 9-402(7) provides a mechanism
which, to some extent, incorporates suggestions made in cases decided
under the 1962 Code. According to the second sentence of section 9-
402(7):
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organiza-
tion its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed financing
statement becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to
perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more
than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financ-
ing statement is filed before the expiration of that time.
113
There are several important features of this provision. First, the
provision does not demand refiling for all name changes, but only for
those that render a filed financing statement seriously misleading."
4
This suggests that the drafters of section 9-402(7) recognized the unfair
consequences to the prospective secured creditor which could flow from
the debtor's seriously misleading change. The imposition of this limita-
tion on the effectiveness of the filed financing statement therefore mili-
tates against the position that the financing statement is only one of
several sources of information for the prospective secured creditor." 5
112. In Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Wolfe City Nat'l Bank, 544 S.W.2d 947 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976), decided under the 1972 Code, the name change of a proprietorship's busi-
ness name from "Lloyd E. Nations d/b/a Nations' David Brown Tractor Co." to "Nation's
Tractor Co." was held to be not seriously misleading within the meaning of§ 9-402(7). As a
result, no new filing was required. In reaching its decision, the court indicated that the
change of a proprietorship's business name cannot ever be seriously misleading to prospec-
tive secured creditors, in view of the requirement of filing under the individual proprietor's
name.
Section 9-403(5) provides an additional improvement over the 1962 Code by authoriz-
ing the secured creditor to file under more than one designation of the debtor's name. By
permitting such filings, the section suggests to secured creditors the significance of the notice
filing system.
113. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1962 version).
114. Whether the change is seriously misleading is a question of fact. An example of a
case where the debtor's incorporation tacitly was held to render the financing statement
seriously misleading to prospective secured creditors under the 1972 Code is United States v.
Ocean Electronics Corp. (In re Ocean Electronics Corp.), 451 F. Supp. 511 (S.D. Cal. 1978)
(in bankruptcy), where the court held that the secured creditor "timely" filed an amendment
to the filed financing statement after the debtor, Steven L. Millis, incorporated his business
as "Photo Shoppe, Inc."
115. See notes 71-77 & accompanying text supra. Although § 9-402(7) underscores the
significance of the financing statement as a source of notice to the prospective secured credi-
tor, a comment to the section explicitly states that "any person searching the condition of the
ownership of a debtor must make inquiry as to the debtor's source of title, andmust search in
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Second, section 9-402(7) renders an originally effective financing
statement ineffective only with respect to collateral acquired more than
four months after the seriously misleading change by the debtor.' 16 By
balancing the interests of both existing and prospective secured parties,
this feature makes the most significant change in the allocation of the
risks involved. The new section effectively provides a four month grace
period to a secured creditor who originally has complied with the
Code's filing requirements, despite the fact that prospective secured
creditors may be misled by the filed financing statement during that
four month period.'" 7 Although this is a significant departure from the
virtually absolute immunity enjoyed by secured creditors making an
originally proper filing under the 1962 Code cases, the section does re-
ward them by granting this four month grace period.
This benefit to existing secured creditors is limited, however, by
the duty to refile under the debtor's new name within the four month
period after a seriously misleading change. As a result of this duty, all
secured creditors who wish to maintain a perfected security interest in
collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after the
debtor's change must monitor the identity of the debtor at least once
the name of aformer owner f/ circumstances seem to require it." U.C.C. § 9-402(7), Comment
8 (1972 version) (emphasis added).
116. This construction of § 9-402(7) finds support in the Official Comments, which pro-
vide that the "old financing statement, flegally still Palid under the circumstances, would
continue to protect collateral acquired before the change and, fstill operative under thepar-
ticular circumstances, would also protect collateral acquired within the four months."
U.C.C. § 9-402(7), Comment 7 (1972 version) (emphasis added). One commentator has sug-
gested that the italicized phrases indicate that, if the secured creditor learns of the debtor's
change and fails to make a timely refiling, then the Code's good faith requirement renders
the financing statement legally invalid and inoperative, thereby divesting the secured party's
interest in all property, whenever acquired by the debtor. Errors and Changes in the Debtor's
Name, supra note 15, at 159-60. This interpretation, albeit creative, finds no support in the
Code. The reference to the financing statement being "legally valid" or "operative" un-
doubtably refers to the limitations on the financing statement imposed by §§ 9-403(2), 9-
403(6), regarding the duration of the financing statement.
117. The metaphysical premise under which the new section operates is akin to that
made by the courts deciding the name or identity change cases under the 1962 Code. Insofar
as the first four months are concerned, according to both the new section and the cases under
the 1962 Code, once the secured creditor has properly filed and therefore perfected the se-
curity interest in the collateral, the secured creditor's security interest in the collateral is
automatically immune from any change by the debtor, regardless of how seriously mislead-
ing the debtor's change really is. This "once properly perfected, always perfected" assump-
tion by the cases, limited to four months duration by § 9-402(7), helps to balance the
burdens between the secured party and all prospective secured creditors; it clearly gives the
secured creditor the benefit of an originally proper filing, while warning the secured creditor
of the dangers resulting from a failure to make a timely refiling when the debtor effects a
seriously misleading name or identity change.
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every four months."l 8 Failure to do so will result in the loss of the
perfected security interest in any collateral acquired more than four
months after the change. By creating this four month monitoring pe-
riod, section 9-402(7) imposes a duty to know on the secured creditor,
without the enormous expense of a continuous duty to know, as appar-
ently required in A-1 Imperial Moving."l9 Similarly, the four month
period also benefits the prospective secured creditor, who need only
search the financing statements under the debtor's name as it has ex-,
isted for the preceding four months. This resulting shift in liability for
the debtor's change of name is an important benefit to the prospective
secured creditor.
In addition, the 1972 amendments explicitly authorize the secured
creditor to refile in the event of a seriously misleading name change by
the debtor. Although under the 1962 Code a financing statement re-
quired the signature of the debtor to be effective, section 9-402(2)(d) of
the 1972 amendments Code authorize the secured creditor to file with-
out the debtor's signature to perfect a security interest in collateral ac-
quired after the debtor's name or identity change. 20 Consequently,
this section fairly allocates the burdens and responsibilities of existing
and prospective secured creditors by decreasing the burden of refiling
on the secured creditor, a mechanism particularly useful when the
debtor is hostile or unavailable.'
2'
Incorporations and Intercorporate Transfers: Changes of Identity or
Corporate Structure
Taylorville. Construing 9-402(7)
Under section 9402(7), the debtor's incorporation or transfer of
collateral to a successor enterprise should be characterized as a change
of identity or corporate structure. To the extent that such a change
causes a financing statement to be seriously misleading the previous
discussion applies equally here. The significant contribution which sec-
tion 9-402(7) advances to resolve the "transfer" problem is the last sen-
tence of the section, which provides that "[a] filed financing statement
remains effective with respect to collateral transferred by the debtor
118. The four month period corresponds to that granted in U.C.C. § 9-103 (1972 ver-
sion).
119. See notes 58-59 & accompanying text supra for a criticism of imposing a continuous
duty to know on the secured creditor.
120. U.C.C. § 9-402(2) (1972 version).
121. The significance of this new section should not be overlooked. The fact that the
dissent in Continental Oil, discussed at notes 61-67 & accompanying text supra, was willing
to accept the secured creditor's attempt to refile a financing statement as sufficient to satisfy
the good faith obligation indicates the practical problems which the secured creditor faces
under the 1962 Code.
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even though the secured party knows of or consents to the transfer."'
' 2 2
At first glance, the import of the last sentence of section 9-402(7)
appears to derive directly from the second sentence. As noted, the sec-
ond sentence operates to cut off the secured creditor's interest in any
collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after the seri-
ously misleading identity change if the secured party fails to make a
timely refiling. Accordingly, the last sentence appears to state merely
what is evident from the second, i e., that no new financing statement
need be filed with respect to the security interest in the specflc property
transferred by the debtor to the successor enterprise. As stated previ-
ously, this property would appear to fall within the four month grace
period in which no new filing was required. Indeed, no financing state-
ment need be refied, as there is no threat to the survival of the secured
creditor's security interest in this property.
Unfortunately, the only court to have construed and applied the
second and third sentences of section 9-402(7) failed to adopt this inter-
pretation. In Houchen v. First National Bank of Pana (In re Taylorville
EisnerAgency, Inc.),123 two individuals purchased a grocery store from
its sole proprietor. To finance the purchase, the individuals received a
loan from a bank, which in turn acquired a security interest in the
store's "fixtures, equipment, inventory, and after-acquired property."
2 4
On the same date that the security agreement was entered into, the
debtors transferred the store's inventory, fixtures, and equipment to a
newly formed corporation in exchange for the corporation's assump-
tion of the debt to the bank. Four days later, the bank, presumably
unaware of the incorporation, filed a financing statement listing the
debtors in their individual capacities.125 More than two years later, af-
ter there had been a "continual change of merchandise and inven-
tory," 2 6 the corporation filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy court determined that, in view of the bank's fail-
ure to file a new financing statement within four months after the incor-
poration, section 9-402(7) required a finding that the bank did not have
a perfected security interest in either inventory or proceeds present at
122. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972 version).
123. 445 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Il. 1977) (in bankruptcy).
124. Id at 666.
125. The court failed to note that, under Illinois law, the debtor entity was more a part-
nership than an individual. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 , §§ 6-7 (Smith-Hurd 1952 &
Supp. 1979). Hence, under the first sentence of § 9-402(7), the bank was obligated to file
under the partnership name, not the individual names of the partners. This deficiency with
the financing statement should not be regarded as a mere technical failing; if indeed true, the
filing failed to identify the debtor and in all likelihood was seriously misleading to prospec-
tive secured parties under § 9-402(8). The effect of this deficiency would be to prevent the
bank's security interest in the named collateral from being perfected.
126. 445 F. Supp. at 667.
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the time of bankruptcy. On appeal, the District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois reversed. The court reasoned that the individual
debtor's incorporation and concomitant transfer of the collateral was
governed exclusively by the third sentence of section 9-402(7) which
upholds financing statements despite knowledge of the transfer by the
secured party, and not the second which invalidates filings for collat-
eral acquired more than four months after the change of identity. The
court reached its conclusion, despite the perfection of the security inter-
est in question as to property acquired more than four months after the
change, ie., the inventory, by distinquishing between the meaning of
the word "collateral" as used in the second and third sentences of sec-
tion 9-402(7). According to the court, "collateral" as used in the second
sentence "is defined as that collateral acquired by the debtor more than
four months after the change," 127 whereas in the third sentence, collat-
eral "must mean the property subject to the security interest as defined
in UCC § 9-105(1)(c)."' 128 By adopting this potentially broader defini-
tion of collateral in the third sentence, the critical issue becomes what is
the "collateral" which is subject to the security interest. In addressing
this issue, the court reasoned that because the security agreement cov-
ered "acquired inventory," the inventory acquired by the corporate
store, although more than four months after the change, was part of the
collateral for which no new financing statement need be refiled under
the third sentence of section 9-402(7).
The rationale employed by the court in Taylorville suffers from
several weaknesses. Initially, there is little sense in contending that the
actual inventory in the debtor's possession at the time of bankruptcy
had ever been transferred by the original debtor entity at the time of
incorporation; obviously, the inventory in the debtor's possession at
bankruptcy was not that property transferred more than two years ear-
lier. Consequently, the opinion in Taylorville is open to two interpreta-
tions.
The first construction of the opinion would restrict its import to
security interests in inventory. By this reading, Taylorville implied that
because inventory characteristically is turned over with a greater fre-
quency than any other type of collateral, inventory, by its very nature,
is never after acquired collateral within the meaning of the second sen-
tence of section 9-402(7). 129 Although perhaps an acceptable construct
127. Id at 669.
128. Id Section 9-105(I)(c) provides that collateral "means the property subject to a
security interest, and includes accounts and chattel paper which have been sold." U.C.C.
§ 9-I05(l)(c) (1972 version).
129. The revolving characteristic of inventory has caused considerable confusion in
other contexts as well. See, e.g., HENSON supra note 5, at 204-10, where the author discusses
the "Mississippi River" approach to determining the proceeds of inventory sales. In the
context of a bankruptcy proceeding, the revolving feature of inventory has been the source
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in other contexts,1 30 application of this principle to section 9-402(7)
would have serious consequences. First, a large class of creditors se-
cured by inventory, distinguishable only by the nature of their security,
would become immune from the responsibilities imposed by the second
sentence of section 9-402(7). Second, adoption of this interpretation
necessitates making an unfounded distinction between those creditors
secured by inventory of debtors effecting a change by way of a transfer
of the collateral (immune from section 9-402(7)), and those creditors
secured by inventory of debtors effecting a formal name change, with
no concomitant transfer taking place (no immunity). Distinguishing
between secured parties on the basis of either the nature of their secur-
ity or the nature of the debtor's change is particularly inappropriate in
view of the uniform treatment which the language of 9-402(7) accords
all secured creditors. Section 9-402(7) appears to advance a four-
month grace period applicable to all secured creditors and conse-
quently gives all secured creditors, regardless of their security, a period
of time within which no new filing is required to maintain the perfected
security interest. 131 Indeed, were these distinctions acceptable implica-
of a historical controversy, zie., whether the debtor's sale and subsequent repurchase of
inventory within four months of bankruptcy involves the transfer of a voidable preference
under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See HENSON, supra note 5, at 269-90.
130. HENSON, supra note 5, at 269-90. However, if the revolving nature of the collateral
is the defining feature of the class, the class also should contain creditors secured by accounts
receivable.
131. Arguably, the automatic four month grace period makes an unreasonable distinc-
tion between secured creditors having a security interest in revolving collateral and those
having a security interest in nonrevolving collateral. The latter class of creditors appear less
likely to suffer the loss of their security interest in the collateral, as the debtor presumably
will have acquired it within four months of the change and is not likely to dispose of it. As a
consequence, the section appears to discriminate against after acquired collateral secured
creditors, particularly those with an interest in inventory or accounts receivable.
Several points should be made in response to this criticism. First, a review of the cases
decided under the 1962 and 1972 Codes reveals that the majority involved after acquired
property financing; further, in virtually all of these cases, the period of time between the
debtor's name change and the debtor's default or bankruptcy was greater than four months.
Hence, as a practical matter, the fact that the operation of § 9-402(7) affects creditors secured
by inventory more than any other type of secured creditor is somewhat justified. See Siljeg
v. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 509 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1975) (in bankruptcy);
Ryan v. Rolland, 434 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1970) (in bankruptcy); Hamilton Bank v. ITT
Diversified Credit Corp. (In re Tri-Cities Music Centers, Inc.), 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 36 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978) (in bankruptcy); Houchen v. First Nat'l Bank of Pana (In re Taylorville Eisner
Agency, Inc.), 445 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (in bankruptcy); Fedders Financial Corp. v.
Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Hammons), 435 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (in
bankruptcy); Avdoyan v. Sun Bank at Pine Hills (In re Sofa Centres, Inc.), 18 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 536 (M.D. Fla. 1975); King v. Williams (In re Conger Printing Co.), 18 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 224 (D. Or. 1975) (in bankruptcy); In re McCoy, 330 F. Supp. 533 (D. Ky. 1971) (in
bankruptcy); In re Veiths, Inc. 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 943 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (in bankruptcy);
Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Bank of Marin, 36 Cal. App. 3d 286, 111 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1973); American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E., Inc., 576 P.2d 566 (Colo. App.
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tions of 9-402(7), the import and effect of the section would be substan-
tially emasculated.
The second possible interpretation of Taylorville requires an ex-
pansive reading of the court's conclusion that the secured creditor's se-
curity interest in the bankrupt's inventory remained perfected for the
sole reason that the security interest originally had been perfected as to
"after acquired inventory." This interpretation implies one of two po-
sitions, either of which is practicably untenable. First, the court may
have implied that the mere use of an after acquired clause by the se-
cured creditor may subject any type of collateral acquired more than
four months after the incorporation to the secured creditor's claims.
This position does no more than advance the unreasonable use of after
acquired collateral clauses as a general means of avoiding all responsi-
bility imposed by the second sentence of section 9-402(7) in the transfer
context.132 The second potential inference to be drawn from an expan-
sive reading of Taylorville is that the third sentence of section 9-402(7)
mandates that no new filing is necessary to perfect a security interest
with respect to "collateral" genericalo, when a transfer takes place.
1978); Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust & Say. Bank, 397 Mich. 203, 244 N.W.2d 243,
arg 57 Mich. App. 1, 225 N.W.2d 209 (1976); In re Pasco Sales Co., 77 Misc. 2d 724, 354
N.Y.S.2d 402 (1974), rev'don other grounds, 52 A.D.2d 138, 383 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1976); Bank of
Va.-Central v. Taurus Constr. Co., 30 N.C. App. 220, 226 S.E.2d 685 (1976); Fliegel v. Asso-
ciates Capital Co. of Del., Inc., 272 Or. 434, 537 P.2d 1144 (1975); Borg-Warner Acceptance
Corp. v. Wolfe City Nat'l Bank, 544 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); First Security Bank of
Utah v. Zions First Natl Bank, 537 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1975); Inter Mountain Ass'n of Credit
Men v. Villager, Inc., 527 P.2d 664 (Utah 1974).
Second, by increasing the potential liability of creditors secured by both presently
owned and after acquired property, the Code has taken a step toward allocating responsibil-
ity among secured creditors in proportion to the potential benefits received under the financ-
ing agreement, ie., the more extensive the creditor's security interest, the greater the
creditor's liability. See Skilton, Security Interest in After-Acquired Property Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. Rav. 925, where the author notes that, at a minimum,
one should "pause for a moment's mediation upon possible dangers that may lurk in a clear
case of overreaching, where there is no commercial reason for an extravagant assertion of a
sweeping security interest, feeling that the taking of too much security may be a disadvan-
tage. . . in fact to the debtor. . . ." Id at 928 n.9.
Finally, although inventory most often will be the type of collateral which the debtor
acquired more than four months after the change, it is not the only collateral with this fea-
ture. For example, as was illustrated in Taylorville, the secured creditor may have a security
interest in after acquired equipment or fixtures. Failure to make a timely refiling by such a
creditor will result in the loss of the security interest in the after acquired collateral. In
addition, if the debtor were to receive the collateral and enter into the security agreement
more than four months after the change and the original financing statement were filed, the
secured creditor's failure to refile would be fatal to the security interest in the collateral.
Consequently, the section does have a wider application than just in the inventory context.
132. At least in the bankruptcy context, the use of the after acquired clause with respect
to equipment to obviate the preference problem created by the debtor's receipt of new
equipment within four months of bankruptcy has been highly questioned. See HENsoN,
supra note 5, at 290-91.
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The impact of this interpretation is obvious: at least with respect to
identity changes involving a transfer of the collateral, no new filing
would ever be required. As a result, section 9-402(7) would have no
meaning in the transfer context. Thus, under any reading of Taylor-
ville, application of the rule to any form of the debtor's change would
run contrary to the purposes of the Code.
The Taylorville approach should be rejected in favor of the more
common sense construction proposed at the beginning of this section.
Since the clear function of the second sentence of section 9-402(7) is to
demand that secured creditors monitor the identity of the debtor and
refile if the debtor has altered its identity significantly, the second sen-
tence should be held applicable to all forms of financing, regardless of
the collateral's nature. The word "collateral" should be defined in both
the second and last sentences of section 9-402(7) as the specific property
involved which is received by the debtor more than four months after
the change or transferred to the successor enterprise. Through such
construction, the courts will effectuate the notice policies section 9-
402(7) was intended to embody.
Reconciling 9-306(2) and 9-402(7)
A remaining problem with section 9-402(7) is the potential conflict
between section 9-306(2), which mandates termination of the security
interest in the collateral upon its authorized disposition, and section 9-
402(7), which makes the secured party's knowledge of or consent to the
transfer irrelevant to the survival of the security interest in the collat-
eral. Absent clarification of this potential conflict, the confusion over
the proper role of section 9-306(2) which existed under the 1962
Code133 conceivably could be exacerbated under the 1972 amendments.
Two resolutions to this conflict already have been suggested. First,
both section 9-306(2) and the last sentence of section 9-402(7) might be
reconciled by drawing an essential distinction between the concepts of
"authorization," referred to in 9-306(2), and "knowledge" or "consent,"
referred to in 9-402(7).'34 Alternatively, section 9-306(2) might be read
to apply to either identity or third party transfers which the secured
creditor understands will discontinue the security interest in the trans-
ferred collateral. The last sentence of section 9-402(7), on the other
hand, would apply to all transfers to which the secured party consented
only because the security interest will continue in the collateral. 35
133. See notes 89-107 & accompanying text supra.
134. See, e.g., Coogan, The New U C C Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REV. 477, 526-27 (1973);
Levenberg, Comments on Certain ProposedAmendments to Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 56 MINN. L. REV. 117, 126-29 (1972).
135. "Justice Braucher of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in a letter submitted to the
Bankruptcy Court states that § 9-306(2) deals with the situation in which the secured party
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These suggested reconciliations, although initially appealing, may
create more problems than they solve. Distinguishing the concept of
"authorization" from "knowledge" may not be difficult, 136 but to dis-
tinguish between the secured party's "consent to" and "authorization
of' a transfer is a much more questionable practice. Similarly, distin-
guishing on the basis of the secured party's "understanding" of the
transfer may present problems which the court will be unable to re-
solve 137 and which the Code certainly did not intend.
The second, less complex means of resolving the conflict between
9-306(2) and 9-402(7) involves restricting section 9-306(2) to third party
transfers1 38 while limiting section 9-402(7) to identity transfer cases.
139
This alternative has several advantages. First, as section 9-402(7)
would be inapplicable to third party transfers, there would be no
change from the pre-amendment practice of not requiring a filing by
the secured creditor upon an unauthorized transfer of the collateral by
the debtor to a third party. Second, this approach avoids the difficulties
associated with distinguishing between various mental states of the se-
cured party, although it does assume there is a cognizable distinction
has agreed that the security interest will no longer exist [in the disposed collateral], and
Revised Section 9-402(7) [sic] deals with the situation where the secured party consents to
the transfer on the understanding that the security interest will continue." Corwin v. RCA
Corp. (In re Kittyhawk Television Corp.), 383 F. Supp. 691, 694 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (in bank-
ruptcy), rev'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1975).
136. Certainly, one may know of something without authorizing it, as in the case when
one knows of but objects to the transfer by the debtor.
137. For an interesting discussion of the means by which the courts should handle diffi-
culties under § 9-402(7), name change problems under the 1962 Code, and the difficulties
associated with establishing the secured creditor's state of mind, see Errors and Changes in
the Debtor's Name, supra note 15, at 159-61.
138. In contrast to the view restricting the application of section 9-306(2) to third-party
transfers, it has been suggested that "in a real case involving this conflict of provisions,
subsection 9-306(2) would determine the relative rights of the competing parties, since un-
like 9-402(7) it is explicitly designed to tell us when a security interest does or does not exist
after transfer of collateral. Revised 9-402(7), on the other hand, is intended only to answer
negatively the question whether a refiling in the name of the transferee is ever required after
transfers of collateral by a debtor. The context of the last sentence of 9-402(7) shows that its
focus is simply on the name under which a security interest, if existent, should be filed."
Coogan, TheNew U. CC. Article9, 86 HARV. L. REV. 477, 527 (1973) (emphasis in original).
139. This approach is suggested in DAVENPORT & MURRAY, supra note 19, where the
authors point out that the comment to § 9-402(7) states "Subsection (7) also deals with a
different problem, namely, whether a new filing is necessary where the collateral has been
transferredfrom one debtor to another," Id at 167 (emphasis added), thereby indicating that
the transfer contemplated was to take place between two debtors. Additionally, in Taylor-
vile the court referred to the comment to the Illinois version of the Code which says in part:
"The proper interpretation (of the third sentence) it is believed, therefore limits the 'transfer'
in question to one by a debtor---e.g., an individual or partnership--to a successor enter-
prise-e.g., a corporation whose stock is owned by the individual or the partners of the
debtor transferor." Houchen v. First Nat'l Bank of Pana (In re Taylorville Eisner Agency,
Inc.), 445 F. Supp. 665, 669 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (in bankruptcy).
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between a third party transfer and an identity transfer. 140 A suggested
method for differentiating between the two kinds of transfers is through
a somewhat novel application of the test first mentioned in Kit-
yhawk,141 ie., analyzing the degree to which the ownership and con-
trol of the former (transferor) and successor (transferee) enterprises are
vested in one and the same entity. Where ownership and control of
both the former and successor enterprises are in the same entity, the
transfer should be deemed one involving an identity change. When, on
the other hand, the former and successor enterprises are owned and
controlled by substantively different entities, the transfer should be
deemed one involving a third party. Although fact situations may arise
that present difficult "borderline" cases, this means of reconciling sec-
tion 9-402(7) and 9-306(2) nonetheless is preferable to those first sug-
gested, as it requires discerning the objective differences between prior
and successor enterprises, as opposed to the subjective differences be-
tween the secured party's mental states.
42
Conclusion
The typical financial statement used by most institutional lenders
to verify the credit-worthiness of potential debtors contains a section
which requires the debtor to list previously encumbered assets, along
with the names of secured creditors. Ideally, the debtor's completion of
this section should prevent the appearance of any of the problems dis-
cussed in this Note: the conscientious debtor would indicate the names
of all secured creditors and the property in which these creditors had
security interests and the prudent lender could thereby evaluate the
reasonableness of extending credit to the debtor.
Of course, the fact that cases arise which involve creditors or
others similarly situated battling over priority in collateral suggests that
commercial practice differs from that which ideally could be expected.
Perhaps this difference can be accounted for by the willingness of pro-
spective secured creditors to ignore prior encumbrances on collateral
and finance a debtor which is a going concern and obviously able to
repay the lender under the terms of the security agreement. Or perhaps
the difference is explained by the failure of many debtors to report
prior encumbrances as forthrightly as prospective secured creditors
140. See note 108 supra.
141. See notes 95-101 & accompanying text supra.
142. Notably, in United States v. Ocean Electronics Corp. (In re Ocean Electronics
Corp.), 451 F. Supp. 511 (S.D. Cal. 1978) (in bankruptcy), the court used the last sentence of
§ 9-402(7) as support for the proposition that, upon an unauthorized disposition of the col-
lateral by the debtor to a third party, no new filing is needed under § 9-306(2). This con-
struction seems highly dubious, as it fails to reconcile the precise language of either of the
sections.
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would hope and the failure of prospective secured creditors to invest
the necessary energy to conduct a thorough investigation into the his-
tory of the debtor.
Regardless of the explanation for the litigation discussed in this
Note, the appearance of section 9-402(7) in the 1972 amendments to
Article 9 provides a mechanism through which all the creditors in-
volved in a secured transaction concerning the debtor's name or iden-
tity change are fairly apprised of the possible consequences of their
actions. For the secured creditor, section 9-402(7) articulates the condi-
tions under which the duty to monitor exists, when the duty to refile
arises, and the limits of the original financing statement, information
which was sorely needed for cases decided under the 1962 Code. For
the prospective secured creditor, the section removes much of the re-
sponsibility of investigating the identity of the debtor imposed by
courts interpreting the 1962 Code, while still providing adequate incen-
tive for the prospective secured creditor to "know" with whom he or
she is dealing. Although still in need of commercially reasonable judi-
cial gloss, the section is an improvement over the judicial approaches to
the problem posed by the debtor's postperfection name or identity
change and may in time be adopted by those jurisdictions which still
have not adopted the 1972 amendments to Article 9.143 Even failing
universal adoption, the section presents a clear solution to a procedural
area that for too long was uncertain.
143. The following jurisdictions have not adopted the 1972 amendments to Article 9:
Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, the Virgin Islands,
Washington, and Wyoming.
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